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Abstract
We used a Guttman model to represent responses to test items over time as an approximation of what is often referred to
as ‘‘points lost’’ in studies of cognitive decline or interventions. To capture this meaning of ‘‘point loss’’, over four successive
assessments, we assumed that once an item is incorrect, it cannot be correct at a later visit. If the loss of a point represents
actual decline, then failure of an item to fit the Guttman model over time can be considered measurement error. This
representation and definition of measurement error also permits testing the hypotheses that measurement error is constant
for items in a test, and that error is independent of ‘‘true score’’, which are two key consequences of the definition of
‘‘measurement error’’ –and thereby, reliability- under Classical Test Theory. We tested the hypotheses by fitting our model
to, and comparing our results from, four consecutive annual evaluations in three groups of elderly persons: a) cognitively
normal (NC, N=149); b) diagnosed with possible or probable AD (N=78); and c) cognitively normal initially and a later
diagnosis of AD (converters, N=133). Of 16 items that converged, error-free measurement of ‘‘cognitive loss’’ was observed
for 10 items in NC, eight in converters, and two in AD. We found that measurement error, as we defined it, was inconsistent
over time and across cognitive functioning levels, violating the theory underlying reliability and other psychometric
characteristics, and key regression assumptions.
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Introduction
Acknowledging and understanding the error associated with
measurement is crucial to improving statistical modeling. Com-
monly, independent variables are treated as if they are error-free,
with responses independent over time [1]; error-free independent
variables is a key assumption of regression [2]. Measurement error
is a source of variability that has traditionally not been considered
in neuropsychology, including the study of cognitive aging or
Alzheimer’s disease (AD) (although see [3] and [4] for counter-
examples). Under classical test theory (CTT; see [5,6]) observed
scores (e.g., cognitive or personality test scores) are considered
imperfect representations of the ‘true’ construct in which we are
actually interested. Intra-individual variability (IIV) can play a
significant role in the design, analysis and interpretation of
psychological and cognitive outcomes (see [4]); in cases where
investigators want to utilize IIV as a longitudinal outcome, rather
than change in total scores, teasing the variability apart from
extent to which a test fails to reflect what is targeted (‘‘real’’ error)
is especially important.
Typically, clinical studies of, and trials of interventions to affect,
AD and mild cognitive impairment are powered to detect a
minimum number of ‘‘points lost’’ – representing cognitive
decline. Although clinicians do not necessarily believe that once
a point on any cognitive test is lost the capacity to answer correctly
itself is permanently lost, the number of points ‘‘lost’’ is used to
represent the amount of cognitive decline that was observed and/
or prevented (e.g., [7–13]; see also [14]).
CTT defines the observed score X as a function of some ‘‘true’’
but unobservable score T plus some ‘‘error’’ that is specific to the
individual (X=T+e) [5]. The true score for an individual is an
unknown constant and the error with which this true score is
measured (yielding X) is an unknown random variable, defined as
being independent of the true score. While the ‘‘true score’’ does
not represent ‘‘The Truth’’ in an absolute sense, it does represent
the error-free version of an individual’s test performance under
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7CTT. This definition implies that the test’s error will not vary
systematically, irrespective of the true score.
Recent work has shown that reliability in cognitive variables can
vary within individuals [4]. Since reliability can be estimated
under CTT as 1-error, this work suggests that assuming a constant
error for any given test might not be appropriate - although this is
a consequence when psychometric characteristics are derived
under classical test theory. The ability to test the independence of
measurement error and true score would be useful for investigators
who use ‘‘high reliability’’ or ‘‘low measurement error’’ as a
criterion for choosing a test.
If the definitions of error and true score under CTT do hold,
then a reliability coefficient for any given test can be calculated
and interpreted, and measurement ‘‘error’’ can be estimated as (1-
reliability) (among other formulae; see [15], pp 69–70; [16]). If the
CTT definitions do not hold, more complex theoretical and
modeling approaches to reliability are available (see [17]; see also
[5] and [6]), although these models are not widely used outside of
formal psychometric contexts (although see [18] for a new
application of modern/formal measurement theory to widely
available tests for clinical research).
‘‘Reliability’’ under CTT is a widely used construct across many
disciplines, but to compute and interpret it assumes that the
distribution of error associated with a test is identical for all
respondents and that the error is independent of the respondent’s
true score. However, X=T+e is not a model, it is a definition ([5],
pp. 119–123); this paper describes a method to define measure-
ment error so as to test these implications – because they are not
testable under CTT ([5]; pp 119–123; [15]; pp 68–9). Our
definition of measurement error is based on the assumption that
‘‘point loss’’ corresponds to ‘‘cognitive decline’’. This restrictive
assumption is consistent with the use of the conceptualization of a
total score over time representing an individual’s level of cognitive
functioning (e.g., [7–13]). This is the first definition of measure-
ment error that can be studied empirically. We use this definition
and approach to estimate measurement error in groups whose
‘‘true scores’’ differ in this study. Comparing error estimated under
our method across these groups will permit us to empirically test
the CTT-derived hypotheses that error is independent of true
scores and that it is constant for a test.
Our model of measurement error is an adaptation of the
Guttman Scale [19]. A key property of a Guttman Scale is that for
any set of items, there is a single hierarchy of endorsement,
acquisition (or loss), or preference. That is, for a set of ordered
items that fit a Guttman Scale, if later items are correct or
endorsed, then it is assumed that all earlier/easier/prerequisite
items are correct or endorsed as well. Thus, every person with a
given total score will have the same pattern of responses [20–23].
This is not an explicit assumption of any cognitive tests in clinical
use today. It is, however, consistent with the definition of ‘‘cognitive
decline’’ based on observing that points on any cognitive test have
been lost over time, and is also implied by the use of these terms in
common practice [6–13,24–27].
Under our approach, responses to one item over time are
treated as the ‘‘hierarchy’’. Each item is individually modeled as a
unidimensional measurement of the ability to respond to that item
over successive evaluations. In our Guttman model of a cognitive
test item over time, correct answers at later visits imply that the item
was correctly answered at all previous visits. An incorrect answer
at a visit implies that the item was (will be) incorrectly answered at
all successive visits; nothing is implied about previous visits. This
model represents a literal ‘‘cognitive loss’’ in the sense that an
incorrect answer is assumed to reflect the loss of the ability to
respond correctly. The main difference between our approach and
a standard cross-sectional Guttman approach is that we have
defined ‘‘measurement error’’ for a given item as a failure of that
item over time to fit a Guttman model. That is, ‘‘error’’ in any
item is defined as a failure of the item to provide a consistent
‘‘signal’’ about the individual’s cognitive state over successive
evaluations (a model of a definition of reliability given in [28],
p. 277]). ‘‘Consistency’’ is defined as observing a pattern for a
given item over time that is consistent with the Guttman model
(see [29]). Crucially, this approach does not distinguish patterns
that are inconsistent with the Guttman model are observed
because of actual measurement error as we have defined it
(‘‘systematic error’’ [29]) from those due to an error that was not a
function of the item (‘‘random error’’ [29]). The Mini Mental State
Exam (MMSE, [30]) is commonly used to test cognitive
functioning, and like most cognitive instruments it is a combina-
tion of items that were selected to represent different cognitive
abilities. Tests such as the MMSE are multi-dimensional,
complicating the estimation of reliability and measurement error.
Further, because cognitive tests such as the MMSE are not all
useful across the full dementia severity range (see, e.g., [14], Ch.
18), it is an excellent representative on which to test our
measurement error definition.
Methods
Ethics Statement
Existing data, collected with informed consent from the subjects
under federally-funded projects at Oregon Health & Science
University (OHSU), were shared with the first author in
accordance with the policy of the National Institutes of Health
(NIH) encouraging data sharing (see http://grants.nih.gov/grants/
policy/data_sharing/), all relevant federal (USA) data sharing and
personal data protection regulations, and OHSU-specific require-
ments (see http://www.ohsu.edu/xd/research/centers-institutes/
neurology/alzheimers/research/data-tissue/data-use-policy.cfm).
All individuals in the data set were administered the same set of
instruments at OHSU by trained and experienced personnel under
NIH-funded, IRB-approved protocols, after obtaining written
consent specific to the study in which their data were collected
and the ongoing maintenance of a database (as outlined in the
above-listed URL). None of these studies were clinical trials. Only
the first four years’ (of a possible 16) of any participants’ visits were
modeled so as to capture sufficient time for cognitive changes (and
errors in their detection) to be observed, while not excessively
limiting the sample size. The data analyzed in this study includes all
participants (described below) whose data were archived as of
November 2004.
Participants
Subjects with AD. Subjects with AD (‘‘AD’’, N=329) are
patients from the Aging and Alzheimer’s Clinic (the clinical core of
the NIA-funded Layton Alzheimer’s Disease Research Center at
OHSU). They originally presented with memory complaints,
either on referral by self, family or health care provider. On
enrolling in the OHSU registry for participation in an NIA-
sponsored longitudinal study, each subject’s clinical history and
exam findings were presented at a weekly case conference where a
consensus diagnosis (based on standard criteria at the time [31])
was reached by the neurologists, geriatric psychiatrists, neuropsy-
chologists and research nurses of the OHSU Alzheimer’s Disease
Center. A battery of tests was administered on each annual visit,
according to the protocol. Of the 329 patients with data, 78 had
MMSE item level information at their first four successive visits.
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ipants (‘‘NC’’, N=412) are research subjects of the Oregon Brain
Aging Study (OBAS [32–33]), a federally-funded (US Veterans
Affairs and National Institute on Aging, NIA) project to study
normal neurological aging. These subjects were known to be
cognitively intact based on the extensive neurological and
neuropsychological assessment they received on enrollment in
OBAS, and on each successive annual evaluation. Of the 412
persons with data, 149 had MMSE item level information at their
first four successive visits.
Subjects with subsequent ‘‘other’’ or questionable/
incipient dementia diagnoses. Subjects in the ‘‘AD to be’’
cohort (‘‘Converters’’ N=185) are individuals from the Aging and
Alzheimer’s Center Clinical Core who were found to be
cognitively intact (i.e., enrolled in OBAS) at their first visit to the
clinic and who subsequently were diagnosed with questionable,
possible or probable AD. On their first visit, the clinical history
and exam findings for each person in this group were presented at
a weekly case conference where a consensus diagnosis – that the
patient did NOT meet diagnostic criteria for possible or probable
AD [31] - was reached by the clinical team. However, at a follow
up annual visit, the individual was characterized as no longer
meeting the criteria for non-demented elderly. Of the 185 persons
with data, 133 had MMSE item level information at their first four
successive visits.
Instrument
The Mini-Mental State Examination (MMSE [30]) is a 30-point
test with items requiring attention, orientation, calculation,
memory, language, and visuospatial functioning. The MMSE,
and change on it, has been used as an outcome measure in clinical
studies, but it is also prevalent as an inclusion criterion for clinical
studies and clinical trials in AD.
Data Analysis
These analyses focused on whether each item over four years fits
the Guttman model in each of three cohorts modeled separately.
To the extent that the item does fit the model, it represents within-
person consistency with a ‘‘cognitive loss’’ interpretation of a
change from correct to incorrect response over successive visits
(and a ‘‘cognitive stability’’ interpretation of the same answer at
any two successive visits). We characterized deviations from this
assumption as ‘‘measurement error’’ (ME, described below) and
compared these estimates across items and cohorts. If ME is not
different for items or cohorts, then standard reliability coefficients
can be computed and interpreted. If ME differs for items, or
cohorts, then key assumptions for regression (error free indepen-
dent variables) and key CTT implications are violated, so that
standard reliability coefficients cannot be interpreted.
Scoring MMSE items
The MMSE has 11 items worth a total of 30 points (using the
scoring given by [34]). The data for two items, worth 3 points each
(name 3 items and follow 3-stage instructions), were not entered
into the data file in a manner that could be consistently recoded to
the 0/1 required by a Guttman model, so these items were
unmodeled. Responses on three items (WORLD spelled back-
wards, 3-item recall, and repeat ‘no ifs, ands or buts’) were recoded
(unless missing) so that perfect performance was ‘correct’ (1) and
otherwise, responses were recoded as 0. Two items (‘‘what county
are we in?’’ and ‘‘what hospital are we in?’’) could not be modeled
because they had high proportions of missing responses due to
changes over time in which question was used, while insufficient
variability was observed in two additional items (take this paper,
fold it in half) so that models did not converge. We assigned one
point to each of the two naming items (typically one point is allotted
for the two correctly-named items). Thus, nine of the original 11
MMSE items were modeled (giving a total of 16 points). These
manipulations of the item-level data were data driven, and not
theoretically motivated – in keeping with our objective that this
method be usable beyond the assessment of cognitive decline.
The Guttman model of measurement error over time
Table 1 reflects a Guttman model of one item over four visits.
Over four successive visits, if an item is incorrect (‘‘0’’) at one
evaluation, it should not be correct (‘‘1’’) at a later visit, or else the
item is not consistent with the Guttman model. Labeling incorrect
answers as zeros and correct answers as ones, four zeros and ones
represents performance on a single item over four test sessions
(annually in this context).
An item can be correct (1111), or incorrect (0000), at all visits
and still be consistent with this model. Both of these patterns would
represent ‘‘stability’’ over time, and this is critical for interpretation
of a reliability coefficient, i.e., that it gives the same information
over repeated assessments. We defined measurement error as a
pattern of responses to an item over time that is inconsistent with
the Guttman model. The proportion of the cohort with
inconsistent patterns on an item represents the estimated
measurement error for that item for that cohort.
Model fit and measurement error
Modeling proceeded using parameters and coding developed by
Dayton [22–23], outlined in Appendix (see also [35–36]) for Excel
(2003, Microsoft Inc., Redmond Washington). Model fit for each
of the MMSE items was summarized with two statistics. The first,
p* (‘‘pi star’’; [37]; see also [22–23]), is an index of how ‘far’ from a
perfect fit to the data the model is [22–23]. The value of p*
indicates what percent of the observations would need to be
Table 1. Example Guttman Scale response patterns for one
item over four visits.
Observed
response pattern
on one item Time 1 Time 2 Time 3 Time 4
Pattern 1 1 1 1 1
Pattern 2 1 1 1 0
Pattern 3 1 1 0 0
Pattern 4 1 0 0 0
Pattern 5 0 0 0 0
Pattern 1 of 11* 0 1 0 0
Notes: 1 indicates the item was answered correctly; 0 indicates it was incorrect.
Patterns in the first five rows are consistent with the Guttman scale. NB: the first
and fifth patterns (1111, 0000) do not represent decline since individuals with
either pattern of responses to this item over the four visits either always or
never exhibited the ability to answer correctly (respectively). Both patterns are
consistent with a Guttman Model because each shows the expected
consistency in what an item reflects about the individual’s state/ability.
*indicates one example pattern of the 11 other possible outcomes for one item
over four visits; none of these other patterns is consistent with a Guttman
Model since the item is shown to have been correct after not being correct at
an earlier visit. There are a total of 16 (2
4) patterns of right (1) and wrong (0)
responses on this item, but only the first five response patterns in this table
represent error-free measurement of decline for the item. The proportion of the
sample that does not exhibit one of these five patterns over four years is the
estimated measurement error for the item.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0030019.t001
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We used p* to estimate the ‘level’ of measurement error for each of
the items. The associated standard errors of the p* values were also
estimated [36]. There is no inference test associated with this
index; values,0.10 are typically used to indicate acceptably small
differences between observed and expected frequencies [22].
An additional summary statistic is the dissimilarity index (DI
[22,37]), which compares expected and observed frequencies of
patterns for the set, based on the assumed model. Large DI values
suggest that the pattern frequencies expected, given that the model
is true, are ‘‘extremely different’’ from the observed frequencies.
There is no inference test associated with this index; values,0.05
are typically used to indicate acceptably small differences between
observed and expected frequencies [22–23].
For both indices, low values suggest better fit of the model to the
data; we could have constructed likelihood ratio tests or computed
information criteria to facilitate inference testing or comparisons of
our model (fully constrained) against less-constrained models, but
our objective was to count the number of items in each group that
did and did not fit the Guttman model. In cases where only one
pattern was observed for an item, computations of these fit
statistics cannot converge, providing no information about
measurement error for that item. We calculated p* and DI for
all MMSE items for which ,5% of responses were missing, the fit
index would converge, and that we could score as 1/0. Since p* has
an associated SE and an interpretation consistent with our
objective, this was our main outcome.
Method
For each item scored as 0/1, a ‘‘response vector’’ for each
participant was constructed using responses obtained over four
years. The first four annual visits were chosen to maximize the
sample size (i.e., the number in each group with multiple
consecutive visits) while also capturing a time frame within which
cognitive changes might be observable and detectable. Sample
sizes dropped precipitously in all cohorts after the fourth year.
Table 1 presents those five vectors of responses on a single item
over four years that correspond to the Guttman model of change,
i.e., only these five patterns should be observed if an item can be
considered to be indicating ‘‘real loss’’ (or ‘‘real stability’’, 0000
and 1111). There are 16 possible vectors (2
4) with which an
individual could respond to an item scored 0 (wrong) or 1 (right)
over four time points. The proportion of each group exhibiting
each of the 16 possible response vectors was calculated per item
with Excel [22–23], and the p* and dissimilarity index values were
computed based on a five-class restricted latent class model [23,38]
(see modeling and estimation details in Appendix S1; modeling
code is available by request from Dr. Yumoto). Values were
estimated for each group, as well as over all individuals.
Results
General descriptive statistics for the three groups are presented
in Table 2. We did not compare the groups statistically on any
demographic variable since neither similarities nor differences in
the groups were relevant to our analysis. We also did not explore
co-morbidities in terms of psychiatric diagnoses since none of the
study participants had such evaluations.
The patients tended to be younger (mean age 70.8, SD: 9.3
years) than the non-demented elderly (mean age: 83.6, SD: 6.7
years) as well as those who were initially cognitively normal but
who were later diagnosed as having some cognitive impairment
(mean age: 84.3, SD: 6.9 years). The patient group was 46%
female while the other two groups were less balanced (NC: 59%
female, Converters: 62% female). MMSE total scores for the four
visits are included in Table 2 for reference; not surprisingly the two
non-demented groups (at baseline) had very similar total MMSE
scores while the patient average was lower.
Model fit results
DI values of ,0.05 indicate small differences (5%) between
what was expected given the model and what was observed, and
p* values of .10 or higher suggest that 10% or more of the data for
that item would need to be eliminated to obtain perfect fit of the
model to the data for that item [22–23]. We focused on p* values,
because they offer estimated standard errors, and used the 0.10
value as a rule of thumb for interpretation of fit results. DI values
were computed as ancillary summary information. Table 3
presents the p* values and Table 4 presents the DI values that
could be calculated per item, for the three groups separately, as
well as the overall values. The overall values were included to
highlight whether any overall measurement error could be traced
to one or another group or could be considered ‘inherent’ to the
item itself.
Collapsing across all respondents, of the sixteen items that we
could model, the p* values for six items met our criteria for ‘‘fit by
a Guttman model’’, i.e., could be considered to reflect loss without
appreciable error (Table 3). These items were to give the year,
name the state and city, spell WORLD backwards, name pencil,
name watch, and read to command (all p*,.05). In fact, 7.5% or
less of the full dataset would need to be eliminated for perfect fit of
these items, plus naming the month (p*=0.064) and writing to
command (p*=0.075), to a Guttman model. Between 10% (name
day) and 43% (‘3 word recall’, recoded as 0/1) of the dataset
would need to be eliminated for a perfect fit in the other modeled
items. In terms of DI over all respondents (Table 4), give the year,
date, and state, name a pencil or watch, and read, write and copy
to command all had DI,0.05. Another four items (name the
season, day, and month, and repeat ‘no ifs, ands or buts’, recoded
as 0/1) had DI,0.075.
For the non-demented elderly controls, ten items (year, day,
month, state, city, paper on floor, name pencil, name watch, read,
write) met our p* criterion for error-free measurement of loss (or in
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics (% or Mean (SD)) for three
cohorts of elderly MMSE respondents with four consecutive
visits.
NC (N=149)
Converters
(N=133) AD (N=78)
Age (Time 1) 83.6 (6.7) 84.3 (6.9) 70.8 (9.3)
% Female 63% 62% 46%
Education (yrs) 13.9 (2.7) 14.0 (2.8) 13.7 (3.3)
MMSE Total: Time 1 28.6 (1.3) 27.8 (1.7) 22.2 (4.6)
MMSE Total: Time 2 28.4 (1.3) 27.8 (1.8) 20.9 (5.6)
MMSE Total: Time 3 28.4 (1.3) 27.4 (2.2) 17.8 (6.8)
MMSE Total: Time 4 28.6 (1.3) 27.1 (2.6) 14.5 (7.7)
MMSE 16 items: Time 1 14.9 (0.9) 14.4 (1.2) 11.2 (2.6)
MMSE 16 items: Time 2 14.7 (1.0) 14.4 (1.3) 10.6 (3.1)
MMSE 16 items: Time 3 14.8 (1.0) 14.3 (1.4) 8.8 (3.7)
MMSE 16 items: Time 4 14.8 (1.1) 14.1 (1.6) 7.0 (4.1)
MMSE Total: range from 0–30. MMSE 16 items: sum of 0/1 score on the 16 items
shown in Tables 3 and 4.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0030019.t002
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the criterion for error free measurement reflected from 10.1%
(name season) to 40% (3-item recall, recoded as 0/1) measurement
error. There was very little loss in this cohort over four years in the
average of either the total MMSE score or the sum of the 16 items
fit with the Guttman model. This homogeneity (high proportions
of items correct at all visits) is reflected in the failures of all but
seven items to converge to a DI (Table 4). Of the seven DI that
were calculable, five failed to meet a 0.05 cutoff (one of these (copy
to command) had DI,0.075). The two items with DI,0.05 were
name the season and put paper on the floor.
For those who were initially non-demented but later were
diagnosed with a cognitive impairment, nine of the 16 items with
converging calculations gave error-free measurement of loss over
time in this cohort according to p* (year, day, month, state, city,
name pencil, name watch, read, write). The seven items that failed
to meet the p* criterion for error-free measurement of loss over
time (season; date; WORLD backwards, 3-word recall, paper on
floor, no ifs ands or buts; copy design) reflected between 15% and
45% measurement error. Similar to the case with the control
group, there was very little change over time in this cohort and DI
(Table 4) failed to converge for six of the 16 items. Of the eight DI
that were calculable, three were under 0.05 (three others (season,
date, put paper on floor) having DI,0.075).
For the AD patients, five of the 16 items (state, 3 word recall,
name pencil, name watch, read) met our p*,0.10 criterion for
error-free measurement of loss over time. For the 11 other items
that failed to meet the definition of ‘error free’ over time, error was
estimated to range between 10% and 33%. All of the 16 items had
convergent dissimilarity indices for this cohort (Table 4), and of
these, three had DI,0.05 (pencil, watch, read); two additional
items (3 word recall and name the state) had DI,0.075.
Discussion
We defined measurement error assuming only that the same
item, administered annually, requires the same trait(s) for correct
response, such that an incorrect response implies the loss of the
trait. This is not especially realistic, but reflects clinical expectation
of what the items are ‘measuring’ and how this is expected to
change over time (e.g., [7–13]; [24–27]), although our method
does not distinguish ‘‘systematic’’ and ‘‘random’’ error types [29]).
We found that most (10/16) of the MMSE items over four visits
were consistent with our model for the control group, and that
fewer items over the same time span were consistent with the
Guttman model for the other two groups. This suggests that
measurement error, as we defined it, depends on the level of the
underlying construct; it was also different by MMSE item.
This definition of measurement error as a ‘‘signal’’ about
change over time empirically estimable; and our results do not
support the selection of cognitive tests using CTT-derived
estimates of reliability and measurement error. Additionally, the
results do not support the assumption that the MMSE is an error-
free independent variable in regression. In contexts where point
loss on tests like the MMSE and cognitive decline are equated
(e.g., [7–13]; [24–27]), standard regression analyses, as well as
typical reliability coefficients, may not provide the expected
information (see [28–29] for discussion of limitations of reliability
for variables that change over time). Because this method
considers one item at a time, the method could be useful for
unidimensional and multidimensional instruments.
There are many limitations to this study. Firstly, it is possible
that some MMSE items do reflect state-based ‘cognitive loss’,
while others do not; our results do not address whether any of the
items that we could not fit are of this state-based loss type. We were
Table 3. p* statistics (standard error), reflecting badness of fit of a Guttman model to each modeled MMSE item over four years.
MMSE Item Over All Groups NC Converters AD
Year 0.030 (.009) 0.007 (.007) 0.015 (.011) 0.103 (.035)
Season 0.164 (.020) 0.101 (.025) 0.152 (.031) 0.308 (.053)
Date 0.269 (.039) 0.235 (.035) 0.152 (.031) 0.231 (.041)
Day 0.103 (.016) 0.040 (.016) 0.068 (.022) 0.282 (.052)
Month 0.075 (.014) 0.020 (.012) 0.045 (.018) 0.231 (.048)
State 0.017 (.007) 0.000 0.000 0.077 (.031)
City 0.036 (.010) 0.000 0.023 (.013) 0.128 (.038)
WORLD{ 0.264 (.025) 0.241 (.036) 0.299 (.043) 0.245 (.063)
3 word recall{ 0.431 (.026) 0.403 (.090) 0.451 (.043) 0.077 (.031)
Paper on floor 0.144 (.019) 0.034 (.015) 0.158 (.032) 0.333 (.054)
Pencil1 0.008 (.005) 0.000 0.000 0.041 (.023)
Watch1 0.004 (.027) 0.000 0.000 0.014 (.014)
No ifs/ands/buts{ 0.302 (.024) 0.302 (.038) 0.371 (.042) 0.182 (.045)
Read 0.039 (.010) 0.027 (.013) 0.030 (.015) 0.077 (.031)
Write 0.064 (.013) 0.034 (.015) 0.030 (.015) 0.179 (.044)
Copy 0.248 (.023) 0.255 (.036) 0.278 (.039) 0.182 (.045)
p* estimates the proportion of observations that are inconsistent with the model under investigation. Low values of p* suggest that very little (100%6p*) of the data do
not fit the model under investigation. Bold values of p* indicate acceptably LOW (,10%) levels of misfit; that is, bold values indicate consistency of the item with the
Guttman (‘real’ loss) Model.
{This item was recoded so that all possible points right=1 and any mistakes=0.
1These items were each assigned one point (i.e., not treated as one point together). Items not represented in this table did not have 0/1 coding (name 3 items), had too
much missing data (what floor are we on? What county are we in?) or failed to converge (take this paper, fold it in half) in all 3 groups (and over all responses) so
estimates of p* were not computable.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0030019.t003
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estimates for) 16 of 30 points on this test, so even if all the other
items passed our definition of ‘‘error-free measurement over time’’,
which we could not establish, the test as a whole would still be
inconsistent with the CTT-based reliability coefficient.
We also treated several items (3-item recall and WORLD
spelled backwards, repeat ‘‘no ifs, ands or buts’’) as dichotomous
(all right/all wrong). This facilitated the interpretability of our
definition of measurement error for these items – but a more
complete evaluation of these – and other- polytomous items,
including a sensitivity analysis to determine if our approach yields
different error rate estimates depending on scoring, will be an
important future study. Also, several items exhibited too little
variability within a group to estimate our summary statistics. That
is, for any item where all respondents exhibited the same response
pattern over time, even if it was consistent with the Guttman scale,
that would be insufficient variability for the model to converge.
Validating our definition of measurement error in a new sample
would be an ideal context for exploring the specific item and item-
type performances.
Our model implies conditional independence [20,22–3] because
we modeled each item as requiring one skill over time. Therefore,
when the effects of that skill are conditioned on, the response
likelihoods become random. There might be some residual
memory for the item over time, but this should be minimal
because the test is just one in a large battery, and the assessments
are 12 months apart. In cases of residual dependency, it could be
attributed to memory for the item, and so would be expected to
decrease as the respondent’s cognitive impairment increases, and
might have contributed to our observation of more items failing to
fit the Guttman model as cohort impairment increased. Therefore,
it is possible that some of the increase in numbers of items failing
to fit the Guttman model as cognitive impairment increased might
be attributable to decreasing memory for the item over time. This
is typically not taken into consideration in clinical applications
where ‘‘point loss’’ is equated with ‘‘cognitive decline’’, and it is
unlikely that this explains all of our results.
We were unable to test whether depression, anxiety, or other
comorbidities may have differentially affected either item-level
performance, performance by each of the diagnostic groups we
studied, or other aspects of our definition of ‘‘measurement error’’.
We were also unable to integrate item-level covariate information,
such as varying sensitivities of individual MMSE items to
comorbidities, particularly if these might vary over disease severity,
the presence of mixed dementias or cerebrovascular features, age,
sex or educational attainment by the study participants.
A final limitation is that our study required as large of a sample,
with item-level data, as possible, and sufficient time to, for
example, ensure that the cognitive normal controls were normal
throughout their observation period (1–16 years), and to observe
transitions in participants who entered the observational study
with a consensus ‘‘diagnosis’’ of cognitively normal and achieve a
clinical diagnosis at a later visit. Balancing these requirements led
to our focus on the first four successive evaluations – and also to
considerable decrement in our samples. Future work to support
any generalizations of our results will also need to address the
different attrition rates in our three groups.
By applying the label ‘‘measurement error’’ to failures of
patterns of responses on items to fit the Guttman model, and
comparing error rates across items and our three diagnostic
samples, we tested the hypothesis that measurement error was
independent of ‘‘true score’’ for the first time in the cognitive
assessment domain. We chose the Guttman model because it is
highly restrictive, and because it maps to the use – if not the
intention- of the construct of ‘‘point loss’’ representing cognitive
decline. Less restrictive definitions of ‘‘error’’ might lead to more
consistent error rates across severity (‘‘true score’’) levels. Future
work could explore our definition compared to others (including
other models, such as [28]) across multiple samples. The method
can easily be adapted for estimating measurement error in other
instruments or disease populations, so that the interpretability of
psychometric characteristics (particularly those derived from CTT)
in those contexts can also be studied. If, as we found, the evidence
suggests that CTT definitions for interpretable reliability estimates
are not supported, alternative estimation – or selection criteria -
should be used.
The ‘‘10% rule’’ as our p* cutoff represents a willingness to
accept up to 10% of misfit, which could include increasing
variation or recovery. Our method provides no information about
the sensitivity to, or reliability for estimating, fluctuating
performance (e.g., [39]), although importantly, current usage of
tests such as the MMSE is almost exclusively to detect ‘‘cognitive
decline’’. CTT-based reliability estimates are often used to choose
the tests to be employed as inclusion or exclusion criteria or as
study endpoints in clinical research (e.g., [14], pp. 108–109; [40],
pp. 22–23; [41], pp. 39–41; [42] pp. 9–17; pp. 24–28), and our
results suggest that this practice may be less strongly supported
Table 4. Dissimilarity Index (DI) values per item, over all
participants and separately by cohort (* indicates that the
solution for DI did not converge so no index value was
calculated).
MMSE Item ALL NC Converters AD
Year 0.029 * * 0.077
Season 0.072 0.013 0.065 0.123
Date 0.038 0.120 0.067 0.110
Day 0.059 * 0.034 0.125
Month 0.068 * 0.030 0.131
State 0.016 * * 0.056
City 0.079 * * 0.100
WORLD{ 0.111 0.093 0.150 0.125
3 word recall{ 0.144 0.119 0.088 0.051
Paper on floor 0.084 0.007 0.074 0.109
Pencil1 0.008 **0.037
Watch1 0.002 **0.013
No ifs/ands/buts{ 0.060 0.121 0.103 0.084
Read 0.024 **0.044
Write 0.040 * 0.029 0.275
Copy 0.052 0.060 0.136 0.150
Note: Dissimilarity indices computed for each item represent how well the
model under investigation produces expected distributions of response
patterns (e.g., from Table 1) that are consistent with observed response
patterns for each item. Higher values suggest less consistency between
observed and expected values; one recommended cutoff for the index is 0.05
(Dayton, 1998) but this is essentially an arbitrary index value cutoff. Bold items
have values below 0.055.
*indicates additional convergence problems when DI was computed.
{This item was recoded so that all possible points right=1 and any mistakes=0.
1These items were each assigned one point (i.e., not treated as one point
together). Items not represented in this table did not have 0/1 coding (name 3
items), had too much missing data (what floor are we on? What county are we
in?) or failed to converge (take this paper, fold it in half) in all 3 groups (and
over all responses) so estimates of p* were not computable.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0030019.t004
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primary goal, our results suggest that intra-individual variability
(IIV), based on MMSE items, increases with greater levels of
dementia severity. This comports with other published work using
other tasks (e.g., [43–46]). Whether our results reflect IIV or not,
they suggest that ‘‘point loss’’ may be an inappropriate proxy for
‘‘cognitive decline’’ with tests like the MMSE.
When measurement error is not independent of the true score,
then estimating reliability for the set of items as a whole becomes
considerably more complicated (see [3] for CTT-based estimation
of reliability when error and true score are not independent; see
[28] for discussion of reliability in longitudinal assessments; see
also [47]). If our results are borne out with independent samples
and other, less-restrictive (but still empirical) definitions of
measurement error, reliability should not be estimated by CTT
for tests like the MMSE.
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